Boeing Boinnnggg

[Stan 386]

As a frequent traveller on Qantas and BA what do you all think of the crash?

1. Where was the 777 involved in the recent incident last maintained?

2 Do you not think it too much of a coincidence that a Qantas 747 had a similar total systems failure a few days ago at Bangkok?

3. Do you happen to have any service details on this aircraft, could it have been similar to your 777?

4.Do you suspect sabotage?

[Bip 88]

Personally I think the pilot deserves a medal for landing the plane in one piece, the outcome could have been quite easily much worse.

If the computers that control most things on these modern passenger aeroplanes are just as reliable as the one I’m sitting in front at the moment I’m not surprised that there isn’t more crash’s.

As we all know when one plan has a problem it is followed shortly by two more, it’s sods law these incidents go in three’s.

Regarding servicing of the aircraft…maybe a Citroen service engineer got his hands on it….they are well known for overcharging and making a crap job of it.

Bip.

[mick2me 3,033]

I fly BA all the time.

Much better than Flying 'Air Chance' (France)

Look what happened to their Concord!

I have it reliably from someone in the trade, that they are the worst!

Bit of metal on the runway, indeed?

[rob237 89]

Personally I think the pilot deserves a medal for landing the plane in one piece, the outcome could have been quite easily much worse.Bip.

Don't forget the pilot of the Kegworth air crash British Midland 737, who was rapidly proclaimed a saviour by the media.

When the interim report came out both he and his co-pilot were dismissed for incompetence, because they switched off the wrong engine.

Can be a rapid transition from hero to zero...

Cheers

Robt P.

[mick2me 3,033]

Wasn't the switching off the wrong engine thing the result of crossed wiring on the warning circuits Rob?

[Beefsteak 305]

If you wan't my opinion the worst airline is 'Garuda' the airline of Indonesia.Very scary flying with them

[Bip 88]

It turns out that the media had got it wrong, who they thought was at the controls when the plane was making it’s landing approach isn’t who they said it was in the first report, It turns out to be John Coward the first officer of Peter Burkill the pilot.

Bip.

[Stan 386]

If you wan't my opinion the worst airline is 'Garuda' the airline of Indonesia.Very scary flying with them

The Qantas `accident, was due to water from the kitchen overflow shorting out ALL the electronics!

[Stan 386]

It turns out that the media had got it wrong, who they thought was at the controls when the plane was making it’s landing approach isn’t who they said it was in the first report, It turns out to be John Coward the first officer of Peter Burkill the pilot.

Bip.

So you suspect pilot error Bip?

[Bip 88]

So you suspect pilot error Bip?

Not going to be drawn into who's fault it might had been.

All I will say is, I iterate my first comment...Computer Crash.

Bip.

[Stan 386]

Not going to be drawn into who's fault it might had been.

All I will say is, I iterate my first comment...Computer Crash.

Bip.

There are some brilliant thoughts on a web page about this(look up 777 on google). One in particular describes abird strike affecting only 1 engine. However this note I thought was well reasoned.

I worked as Flight Line Avionics Tech for Boeing Experimental Flight Test on the first few 777’s. About 16 months. It IS fly by wire but the elevator has a wire / cable backup.

The engines are Rolls, GE or Pratt’s they are similar but different. They have onboard FADEC type controls right on each engine. You could say they are fly by wire. If they loose signal from the auto flight systems and or the throttle quadrate transmitters in the isle stand of the cockpit they should go to FLIGHT IDLE which I was told would keep the aircraft airborne, especially close in with flaps extended.

I can tell you for a fact Boeing went to the 9’s on all the wiring for the fly by wire.

In case of catastrophic failure, each of the three Flight Control Computers has just beneath them there own UPS, if you will. They will maintain electrical power and control, but for a short time only, basically just the time needed to deploy the

RAT or Ram Air Turbine. This deploys automatically from the port belly, it is a blade or prop arrangement connected to a drive unit that ‘Pops down into the air stream and turns like a mini wind mill generating power. This will supply emergency power electrical and hydraulic. I was working the aircraft in Flight Test when Boeing flew out and turned of all the power on the aircraft and flew it on ONLY RAT power.

Boeing tests more extensively than anyone else. A777 was tested to the point of destruction across the street from flight test, the so called Iron Bird. They pulled the wings off, not a cheap thing to do at 140 million a copy.

The questions I have are? Why was control lost to the engine throttles, if that is what happened. Did they go to flight idle? If so why did the aircraft glide path continue to be to steep? And how and did the RAT perform? You can thank God for the result of this incident as I do. I have flown many hours aboard the 777. But consider thanking the airlines commitment to good employees and their training and of course Boeing and their stubborn relentless flight test programs.

[rob237 89]

There are some brilliant thoughts on a web page about this(look up 777 on google)

Stan,

I would never ever doubt the technical brilliance of Boeing, nor the latent abilities of a trained pilot handling their aircraft.

IMO, our ability to comprehend what happened is totally compromised by our SOLE source of information...viz. our abysmal media pedalling out instant speculation and conjecture in the guise of 'accurate' reporting.

In the event of any national or international catastrophe a majority of Brits will immediately digest the rubbish served up by the London gutters and rolling 24 hour TV News.

Examples abound at the time of every incident...look no further back than the garbage reported following 2007 Pendolino derailment at Grayrigg.

I watched the initial BBC 24 coverage, until I rapidly tired of their studio morons grilling the likes of flight expert David Learmount with.."We don't want to speculate, but what do you think happened?"

Friday editions of the London gutters had prominent boxes, within their reports, seeking information on the 777 pilot...I'd guess ostensibly to 'dig for dirt'. Certain that today's editions will switch their attention to the co-pilot, who has now become the 'new' hero.

That's why we can't properly submit an objective view to your initial questions!

Cheers

Robt P.

[rob237 89]

As a lighter aside:

Apparently, when the local Central ITV news teams heard that at last they had had a major incident on their doorstep, they all rushed off at top speed...to Keyworth.

Cheers

Robt P.

[Beefsteak 305]

As a lighter aside:

Apparently, when the local Central ITV news teams heard that at last they had had a major incident on their doorstep, they all rushed off at top speed...to Keyworth.

Cheers

Robt P.

On the lighter side with you also Rob, my mate was a fireman at East Midlands Airport (He had been for 20 years at that point) and he was away on holiday at the time of the disaster.

He has now retired never having to "Fire a shot in anger" so to speak

[rob237 89]

On the lighter side with you also Rob, my mate was a fireman at East Midlands Airport (He had been for 20 years at that point) and he was away on holiday at the time of the disaster.

He has now retired never having to "Fire a shot in anger" so to speak

Trust that his pension wasn't adjusted accordingly!

Cheers

Robt P.

[Limey 242]

IMO, our ability to comprehend what happened is totally compromised by our SOLE source of information...viz. our abysmal media pedalling out instant speculation and conjecture in the guise of 'accurate' reporting.

In the event of any national or international catastrophe a majority of Brits will immediately digest the rubbish served up by the London gutters and rolling 24 hour TV News.

Examples abound at the time of every incident...

You've got that right - an article in The Guardian on Friday noted that the "emergency thrust engine in the tail" was not operating at the time! I presume they mean the APU - which could supply about as much thrust as the pilot farting! It's only purpose is to supply electrical power when the aircraft is on the ground and there is no "ground service" available!

Makes you wonder!

[Stan 386]

You've got that right - an article in The Guardian on Friday noted that the "emergency thrust engine in the tail" was not operating at the time! I presume they mean the APU - which could supply about as much thrust as the pilot farting! It's only purpose is to supply electrical power when the aircraft is on the ground and there is no "ground service" available!

Makes you wonder!

One final thought crossed my twisted mind. When the final truth(or what is reported as truth) comes out and blame is shifted to the aircrew as happens quite frequently, did you notice how swiftly the captain passed the responsibility for the landing to his co-pilot. So if the engines were not spooled up and there was not sufficient forward thrust,who gets it in the neck?

[rob237 89]

One final thought crossed my twisted mind. When the final truth(or what is reported as truth) comes out and blame is shifted to the aircrew as happens quite frequently, did you notice how swiftly the captain passed the responsibility for the landing to his co-pilot. So if the engines were not spooled up and there was not sufficient forward thrust,who gets it in the neck?

Funny that Stan...my mind twisted in a similar direction when I saw the Capt. speaking at the press conference..

My thought was that his body language seemed rather odd.

Indication below of how the London gutters are, predictably, behaving:

High Fryers

The Sun leapt into action yesterday after witnesses called for medals the “size of a frying pan” for jet heroes Peter Burkill and John Coward.

We had two huge awards struck for the pair (see image in main story).

The Sun gongs are inscribed “Hero of Heathrow” and the citation adds: “This award for bravery is presented to Capt Peter Burkill/First Officer John Coward for saving the lives of 152 passengers and crew aboard the Boeing 777 he safely landed after an engine failure.”

Last night a spokesman for Balpa, the pilots’ association, said the pair could be nominated for a prestigious industry award.

Cheers

Robt P.

[Stan 386]

Funny that Stan...my mind twisted in a similar direction when I saw the Capt. speaking at the press conference..

My thought was that his body language seemed rather odd.

Indication below of how the London gutters are, predictably, behaving:

High Fryers

The Sun leapt into action yesterday after witnesses called for medals the “size of a frying pan” for jet heroes Peter Burkill and John Coward.

We had two huge awards struck for the pair (see image in main story).

The Sun gongs are inscribed “Hero of Heathrow” and the citation adds: “This award for bravery is presented to Capt Peter Burkill/First Officer John Coward for saving the lives of 152 passengers and crew aboard the Boeing 777 he safely landed after an engine failure.”

Last night a spokesman for Balpa, the pilots’ association, said the pair could be nominated for a prestigious industry award.

Cheers

Robt P.

[Stan 386]

find this new format more difficult than understanding Blair`s spin, but;

(just issued)

Safety Action

As a result of this occurrence, the aircraft operator, as part of their ongoing investigation, has taken the following safety actions:

1. 1. An internal message to all crews was issued, requiring the use of full take-off thrust to be used for all missed approaches. Engine thrust was not to be reduced until commanded by the flight mode annunciator.

2. 2. A flight standing order was published, which revised the missed approach procedure and associated crew actions.

Actualy it was an Airbus not a Boeing 767, but result is the same. The situation below is as close to identical as to what probably happened to the BA Flight yesterday.

These pilots wil definitely be off for retraining if not jail. Read on......Heroes? I don't think so...

Missed Approach Melbourne Airport 21 July 2007

Airbus A320-232, VH-VQT

Preliminary

Melbourne Airport

21 July 2007

Airbus A320-232, VH-VQT

History of the flight

On 21 July 2007, an Airbus A320-232 aircraft, registered VH-VQT, was being operated on a scheduled international regular public transport service between Christchurch, New Zealand and Melbourne, Australia.

Following an uneventful flight from New Zealand, the crew were conducting an instrument landing system (ILS) approach to runway 27 at Melbourne. Weather conditions were forecast to include fog, which had subsequently eventuated and was likely to necessitate an instrument approach to the minimum altitude on the approach. The likelihood of the crew having to conduct a missed approach was high, as aircraft ahead of VQT had already conducted missed approaches because of the low visibility and fog. The crew had been aware of these conditions prior to departure and had flight planned accordingly. They had also conducted a briefing on the likelihood of having to conduct a missed approach prior to commencing the descent into Melbourne.

At the decision height on the ILS approach, the crew did not have the prescribed visual reference and commenced a missed approach. During the initial part of the missed approach, the crew were not aware that the aircraft had not transitioned to the expected flight guidance modes1 for the missed approach. When the aircraft did not respond as expected, the crew took manual control of the aircraft. The crew were subsequently processed by air traffic control (ATC) for another approach to Melbourne Airport. This second approach also resulted in the crew conducting a missed approach and the aircraft was subsequently diverted to Avalon Airport, where it landed uneventfully. During the second missed approach, the aircraft systems functioned correctly.

Operating procedures and systems description

Due to the forecast and formation of fog, the crew were flying the approach using low visibility operating procedures that required the pilot-in-command to assume the role of handling pilot and the first officer to take the role of non-handling pilot. The aircraft was being flown using the autopilot system.

The A320 aircraft uses a number of flight control computers to provide guidance mode input to the autopilot to provide aircraft control. During an ILS approach, the applicable guidance modes are glideslope and localiser. These modes provide vertical and lateral guidance for the aircraft during the approach.

Engine power can be controlled by the auto-thrust system, which the crew reported was active at the time. The thrust levers can be placed in any one of four detents on the thrust lever quadrant according to the phase of flight.2 During a normal instrument approach, the levers are in the climb (CL)3 detent. If auto-thrust is active, then the aircraft’s speed is controlled by the thrust commanded by that system. The two detents forward of the CL detent are the flexible takeoff/maximum continuous thrust (FLX/MCT)4 detent and the takeoff/go around (TO/GA)5 detent.

2 The A320 thrust control system does not require the pilot to continuously manipulate the thrust levers, rather the pilot places thrust levers in the appropriate detent and thrust is commanded in response to flight control computer and auto-thrust system inputs.

4 The FLX/MCT detent provides maximum continuous thrust from the engines or is used when conducting a flexible temperature takeoff procedure. A flexible temperature takeoff is a procedure whereby a slightly reduced takeoff thrust is commanded when full take-off power is not required.

At the decision height for the approach6, if the crew are not visual with the runway environment, they are required to conduct a missed approach. This involves the handling pilot advancing the thrust levers from the CL detent7 to the TO/GA position and positively rotating the aircraft to a climb attitude. It also involves a number of callouts from the crew in response to the manoeuvre, and subsequent actions to reconfigure the aircraft to a climb configuration.

Movement of the thrust levers to the TO/GA position provides inputs to the flight control computers to initiate a change to the flight guidance modes. In a missed approach, the applicable modes are speed-reference-system (SRS) and go-around track (GA TRK). In the go-around manoeuvre, the SRS system provides guidance to maintain the speed which existed at the commencement of the missed approach procedure, while GA TRK provides lateral tracking guidance. The engines had already been commanded to provide thrust to allow the aircraft to climb away in the missed approach in response to the pilot advancing the thrust levers.

A review of recorded flight data and crew interviews revealed that, after moving the thrust levers to commence the missed approach, the aircraft appeared to not respond correctly and the flight control computers remained in the localiser and glideslope modes. Both crew members recalled hearing and feeling an increase in engine thrust and there appeared to be an apparent pitch up in response to the procedure.

The pilot-in-command reported that, when the aircraft did not respond appropriately, he disconnected the autopilot system and attempted to fly the aircraft manually. He reported that he input pitch control to command an appropriate nose-up pitch attitude. However, the aircraft initially continued to descend. Further control inputs from the pilot-in-command resulted in the aircraft commencing to climb, and the crew commanded retraction of the landing gear and reconfigured the aircraft for climb.

Once the aircraft had commenced climb, the crew contacted ATC and were radar vectored for another instrument landing system approach to runway 16 at Melbourne Airport. The approach to this runway also resulted in the crew not achieving the required visual reference at the decision height, and another missed approach was conducted. During the second missed approach, the aircraft systems functioned correctly. Following that missed approach, the crew diverted the aircraft to Avalon Airport where a normal landing was carried out.

The crew reported that prior to commencing the flight from New Zealand, they were both adequately rested.

3 The CL detent provides power up to maximum climb thrust from the engines.

5 The TO/GA detent provides maximum take-off thrust from the engines.

6 The decision height for the runway 27 ILS approach at Melbourne Airport is 200 feet above ground level.

7 The CL detent corresponds to a thrust lever angle of 22 degrees.

Recorded flight data

Recorded flight data from the flight had been retrieved from the onboard flight data interface management unit (FDIMU) by the operator and was provided to the ATSB. Examination of the recovered flight data indicated that at the commencement of the first missed approach, at approximately 200 ft above ground level (AGL), the thrust lever positions were moved forward of the FLX/MCT detent8 for a short period before being retarded to that position. Simultaneously, the flaps and slats were retracted to the FLAP 3 position from the FULL position.9 The autopilot remained engaged during the commencement of the missed approach and was disengaged shortly after the flaps had been retracted. The recorded radio altimeter height at this time was between 58 and 72 feet. Selected recorded parameters are shown at Figure 2. The aircraft was climbed to approximately 650 ft AGL and remained at that altitude for approximately 17 seconds, before it commenced a shallow descent. Shortly after commencing this descent, the thrust levers were moved to the TO/GA detent10 and coincident with that movement, another EGPWS ‘don’t sink’ warning activated. After the thrust levers were moved to the TO/GA detent, the aircraft continued to climb and no further warnings or alerts were recorded.

The investigation is continuing and will examine the following areas:

8 FLX/MCT detent was at a thrust lever angle of 34 degrees.

9 FLAP 3 positions the flaps to 20 degrees and the slats to 22 degrees of extension. The FULL position has the flaps extended to 35 degrees and the slats to 27 degrees.

[Stan 386]

find this new format more difficult than understanding Blair`s spin, but;

(just issued)

Safety Action

As a result of this occurrence, the aircraft operator, as part of their ongoing investigation, has taken the following safety actions:

1. 1. An internal message to all crews was issued, requiring the use of full take-off thrust to be used for all missed approaches. Engine thrust was not to be reduced until commanded by the flight mode annunciator.

2. 2. A flight standing order was published, which revised the missed approach procedure and associated crew actions.

Actualy it was an Airbus not a Boeing 767, but result is the same. The situation below is as close to identical as to what probably happened to the BA Flight yesterday.

These pilots wil definitely be off for retraining if not jail. Read on......Heroes? I don't think so...

Missed Approach Melbourne Airport 21 July 2007

Airbus A320-232, VH-VQT

Preliminary

Melbourne Airport

21 July 2007

Airbus A320-232, VH-VQT

History of the flight

On 21 July 2007, an Airbus A320-232 aircraft, registered VH-VQT, was being operated on a scheduled international regular public transport service between Christchurch, New Zealand and Melbourne, Australia.

Following an uneventful flight from New Zealand, the crew were conducting an instrument landing system (ILS) approach to runway 27 at Melbourne. Weather conditions were forecast to include fog, which had subsequently eventuated and was likely to necessitate an instrument approach to the minimum altitude on the approach. The likelihood of the crew having to conduct a missed approach was high, as aircraft ahead of VQT had already conducted missed approaches because of the low visibility and fog. The crew had been aware of these conditions prior to departure and had flight planned accordingly. They had also conducted a briefing on the likelihood of having to conduct a missed approach prior to commencing the descent into Melbourne.

At the decision height on the ILS approach, the crew did not have the prescribed visual reference and commenced a missed approach. During the initial part of the missed approach, the crew were not aware that the aircraft had not transitioned to the expected flight guidance modes1 for the missed approach. When the aircraft did not respond as expected, the crew took manual control of the aircraft. The crew were subsequently processed by air traffic control (ATC) for another approach to Melbourne Airport. This second approach also resulted in the crew conducting a missed approach and the aircraft was subsequently diverted to Avalon Airport, where it landed uneventfully. During the second missed approach, the aircraft systems functioned correctly.

Operating procedures and systems description

Due to the forecast and formation of fog, the crew were flying the approach using low visibility operating procedures that required the pilot-in-command to assume the role of handling pilot and the first officer to take the role of non-handling pilot. The aircraft was being flown using the autopilot system.

The A320 aircraft uses a number of flight control computers to provide guidance mode input to the autopilot to provide aircraft control. During an ILS approach, the applicable guidance modes are glideslope and localiser. These modes provide vertical and lateral guidance for the aircraft during the approach.

Engine power can be controlled by the auto-thrust system, which the crew reported was active at the time. The thrust levers can be placed in any one of four detents on the thrust lever quadrant according to the phase of flight.2 During a normal instrument approach, the levers are in the climb (CL)3 detent. If auto-thrust is active, then the aircraft’s speed is controlled by the thrust commanded by that system. The two detents forward of the CL detent are the flexible takeoff/maximum continuous thrust (FLX/MCT)4 detent and the takeoff/go around (TO/GA)5 detent.

2 The A320 thrust control system does not require the pilot to continuously manipulate the thrust levers, rather the pilot places thrust levers in the appropriate detent and thrust is commanded in response to flight control computer and auto-thrust system inputs.

4 The FLX/MCT detent provides maximum continuous thrust from the engines or is used when conducting a flexible temperature takeoff procedure. A flexible temperature takeoff is a procedure whereby a slightly reduced takeoff thrust is commanded when full take-off power is not required.

At the decision height for the approach6, if the crew are not visual with the runway environment, they are required to conduct a missed approach. This involves the handling pilot advancing the thrust levers from the CL detent7 to the TO/GA position and positively rotating the aircraft to a climb attitude. It also involves a number of callouts from the crew in response to the manoeuvre, and subsequent actions to reconfigure the aircraft to a climb configuration.

Movement of the thrust levers to the TO/GA position provides inputs to the flight control computers to initiate a change to the flight guidance modes. In a missed approach, the applicable modes are speed-reference-system (SRS) and go-around track (GA TRK). In the go-around manoeuvre, the SRS system provides guidance to maintain the speed which existed at the commencement of the missed approach procedure, while GA TRK provides lateral tracking guidance. The engines had already been commanded to provide thrust to allow the aircraft to climb away in the missed approach in response to the pilot advancing the thrust levers.

A review of recorded flight data and crew interviews revealed that, after moving the thrust levers to commence the missed approach, the aircraft appeared to not respond correctly and the flight control computers remained in the localiser and glideslope modes. Both crew members recalled hearing and feeling an increase in engine thrust and there appeared to be an apparent pitch up in response to the procedure.

The pilot-in-command reported that, when the aircraft did not respond appropriately, he disconnected the autopilot system and attempted to fly the aircraft manually. He reported that he input pitch control to command an appropriate nose-up pitch attitude. However, the aircraft initially continued to descend. Further control inputs from the pilot-in-command resulted in the aircraft commencing to climb, and the crew commanded retraction of the landing gear and reconfigured the aircraft for climb.

Once the aircraft had commenced climb, the crew contacted ATC and were radar vectored for another instrument landing system approach to runway 16 at Melbourne Airport. The approach to this runway also resulted in the crew not achieving the required visual reference at the decision height, and another missed approach was conducted. During the second missed approach, the aircraft systems functioned correctly. Following that missed approach, the crew diverted the aircraft to Avalon Airport where a normal landing was carried out.

The crew reported that prior to commencing the flight from New Zealand, they were both adequately rested.

3 The CL detent provides power up to maximum climb thrust from the engines.

5 The TO/GA detent provides maximum take-off thrust from the engines.

6 The decision height for the runway 27 ILS approach at Melbourne Airport is 200 feet above ground level.

7 The CL detent corresponds to a thrust lever angle of 22 degrees.

Recorded flight data

Recorded flight data from the flight had been retrieved from the onboard flight data interface management unit (FDIMU) by the operator and was provided to the ATSB. Examination of the recovered flight data indicated that at the commencement of the first missed approach, at approximately 200 ft above ground level (AGL), the thrust lever positions were moved forward of the FLX/MCT detent8 for a short period before being retarded to that position. Simultaneously, the flaps and slats were retracted to the FLAP 3 position from the FULL position.9 The autopilot remained engaged during the commencement of the missed approach and was disengaged shortly after the flaps had been retracted. The recorded radio altimeter height at this time was between 58 and 72 feet. Selected recorded parameters are shown at Figure 2. The aircraft was climbed to approximately 650 ft AGL and remained at that altitude for approximately 17 seconds, before it commenced a shallow descent. Shortly after commencing this descent, the thrust levers were moved to the TO/GA detent10 and coincident with that movement, another EGPWS ‘don’t sink’ warning activated. After the thrust levers were moved to the TO/GA detent, the aircraft continued to climb and no further warnings or alerts were recorded.

The investigation is continuing and will examine the following areas:

8 FLX/MCT detent was at a thrust lever angle of 34 degrees.

9 FLAP 3 positions the flaps to 20 degrees and the slats to 22 degrees of extension. The FULL position has the flaps extended to 35 degrees and the slats to 27 degrees.

[Stan 386]

Or as another pilot descibes it in simple terms:

This my freinds, the near miss in Australia, I might point out is almost identical to the incident in Britain. The plane descended through fog just as in Oz. They were probably shy of the runway when they decided on a GA (Go Around). They moved the thrust levers forward to the GA position but did not lock them in. The result is that the plane would continue to descend rather than go to full throttle and pul up. Result? The plane ditches into the ground with no thrust and before the runway. Classic. I will bet my left testicle this is exactly what happened. If I were the pilots, I would be looking for another job.

? the reason buck passed to 1st Officer?

[Stan 386]

British Airways ice in fuel report triggers urgent review of air safety

An urgent review of air safety has been ordered after investigators found that ice blocking the fuel supply caused a British Airways passenger jet to crash land at Heathrow.

By David Millward, Transport Editor

Last Updated: 7:46AM BST 05 Sep 2008

The Air Accidents Investigation Branch warned that "immediate action" must be taken out to assess whether the problem which caused the Boeing 777 accident could affect other aircraft.

It also demanded that Boeing put in place new safety measures to ensure that planes travelling at high altitude in temperatures far below freezing do not suffer a potentially disastrous build up of ice in their fuel systems.

The recommendations were made in a report into the crash in January in which a BA 777 flying from Beijing crash landed short of the runway with 136 passengers and 16 crew on board.

One passenger suffered a broken leg and 12 others minor injuries in the worst aviation accident at Heathrow in more than 30 years.

There are nearly 700 Boeing 777s in service and they are one of the workhorses of the skies for long-haul flights.

They include 220 planes powered by the Rolls Royce Trent 800 engine involved in the Heathrow accident, currently operated by 11 airlines, including British Airways.

Aviation experts expressed concerns that it was largely due to "good fortune" that the accident, the worst incident at Heathrow since 1972 when 118 people were killed after a BEA Trident crash, had not been worse.

Passenger groups called for airlines to take all necessary steps to ensure there was no repeat.

Kieran Daly, editor of the online news service Air Transport Intelligence, said: "There was a considerable degree of good fortune here which prevented this being a truly catastrophic accident.

"Nevertheless it is literally a one in several million chance that this happened. As ever in the aviation industry, people are being extremely cautious about this."

[Frank 13]

Makes me wonder how they knew it was Ice?

By the time they started to look for the fault it would be nice and warm and the ice would have melted!

[Bip 88]

I don’t pretend to be a expert but wouldn’t warming the fuel in some way alleviate the problem somewhat?

Bip.